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NAMIBIA: IS SOUTH AFRICA PLAYING FOR TIME? 
The people of Namibia (South West Africa) have been struggling against colonial occupation and oppression for 
nearly JOO years. First, they fought the Germans who colonized the country in the late IBOO's. Following World War I, 
the League of Nations gave South Africa a mandate to "protect" the country. South Africa has used this power to ex-
ploit both the labor of the Namibian people and the vast mineral wealth of the country. In 1966 the United Nations (UN) 
withdrew the mandate, and later the World Court ruled that South Africa '.s presence in Namibia was illegal. South Africa, 
ho wever, has refused to leave. Since 1966 the South West Africa People '.s Organization (S WA PO)hasfought militarily to 
overthrow South Africa'.s control in Namibia. 
The Namibian conflict has become a major international issue. The UN has worked toward an internationally ac-
ceptable solution to this difficult problem. In 1978 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 435 which calls for 
free elections and self-determination in Namibia. The Western Contact Group (US, Great Britain, France, Germany, 
and Canada) and the African Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) 
have attempted to negotiate a meaningful settlement. South Africa, however, has not moved. 
What fallows is an interview with farmer UN Ambassador Donald F. McHenry, who has worked on the Namibian 
issue for a number of years. As UN Ambassador, McHenry coordinated the Contact Group effort. During a two-hour 
interview with Randall Robinson, McHenry discussed the current Namibian situation in his Georgetown University 
office. 
How do you respond to those who say that a new ap-
proach to US-South Africa relations had to be tried with 
more carrot and less stick? 
McHenry: I find the characterization which has been 
used insulting, frankly. There is always an effort on the 
part of a new administration to try and push its own 
proposals by downgrading and negating those c,f the 
past. This Administration has done this to a greater ex-
tent than any I have seen before-even to the point of 
mischaracterizing what has gone on before. I don't re-
member that we engaged in the kind of sterile rhetoric 
which Mr. Haig and Mr. Crocker seem to be painting. I 
don't remember that we were only critical of the South 
Africans. We did make it clear to them that there could 
be no improvement in our relations unless there was 
progress on three issues: Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and apartheid. Now, this puts the control in 
terms of improving relations in the hands of the South 
Africans. 
WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS DOING IS 
COVERING UP ITS OWN EFFORTS TO COZY UP 
TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS BY TRYING TO CON-
TRAST WITH THE OTHER ADMINISTRATION AS 
IF WE STOOD ON THE TOP OF THE ROOF 
EVERYDAY TO SCREAM AT THE SOUTH 
AFRICANS. 
0 ' I think the record of South African intransigence on the 
question of Namibia is abundantly clear, and I think the 
participants in this Administration know it. 
_g 
0.. 
Ambassador McHenry and Randall Robinson 
In the current search for a Namibian solution do you 
believe that the interests of the South African people are 
being compromised? 
McHenry: Well, I think they have been compromised 
already. In addition, I think the relations between the 
US and the rest of Africa have already been adversely 
affected. I think the South Africans have the view that if 
they talk about how pro-Western and anti-communist 
and Christian they are that people will forget the treat-
ment of their own people. It is perfectly obvious at a 
time when the Administration is making more positive 
statements of South Africa, allowing the training of 
coast guard personnel, increasing the attaches in this 
country, and doing a number of other things in the way 
of liberalization of the arms embargo, the South 
Africans are moving in the opposite direction. You have 
a much more conservative government now. Even those 
things which passed as reforms have been stalled in their 
tracks over the last six to nine months. Moreover, if I 
were the Administration I would be very concerned that 
we have not fallen into the strategy of the South 
Africans. 
THE SOUTH AFRICANS WANT TIME: TIME TO 
WI PE OUT SWAPO IF THEY CAN, TIME TO 
STRENGTHEN THE DEMOCRATIC TURNHALLE 
ALLIANCE (DTA) IF THEY CAN, TIME TO GIVE 
IT GOVERNMENT AL PRACTICE, TIME TO 
ALLOW THE DT A TO CONTEST THE GOVERN-
MENT IF IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT MUST. 
And so instead of picking up and pressing the South 
Africans as the Administration should have done when 
it came into office, it stepped back, it loosened the 
pressure on them; and it had done that before the elec-
tion. 
Do you think this Administration genuinely wants a 
Namibian solution? And if so, why? 
McHenry: Well, I think they want a settlement of the 
question. The continuation of the conflict is in no one's 
interest. They want a settlement; however, not on the 
basis of its merits, but for ulterior motives. 
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THEY SEE EVERYTHING THROUGH AN EAST-
WEST LENS. SO THEY SEE A SETTLEMENT AS 
NOT JUST GIVING JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE OF 
NAMIBIA BUT AS FIGHTING THE SOVIET 
UNION. THEY SEE IT IN TERMS OF TRYING TO 
USE THE SETTLEMENT AS LEVERAGE AGAINST 
THE CUBANS IN ANGOLA. 
They want to cozy up to the South Africans because of 
silly reasons such as strategic minerals or access to the 
Cape route. In the final analysis, these things have no 
real meaning in the practical world. These are nice 
theories for text books, but when you 're dealing with 
practicalities, these things aren't very relevant. If we 
were ever in a conflict, South Africa's two-bit navy 
wouldn't do very much to protect the Cape route. If we 
were ever endangered in terms of natural resources, 
South Africa can't eat its resources, it wants to market 
them. In addition, I think we ought to have learned by 
now that a combination of conservation and the cessa-
tion of the wasteful practices of the American people 
can go a long way toward providing even the most 
strategic minerals. 
Secretary of State Haig declared recently that the 
Reagan Administration policy has "fundamentally 
changed" South Africa's attitude toward the in-
dependence of Namibia and that independence could 
come in 1982. Do you see a basis for this optimism? 
McHenry: Well, I don't know what Mr. Haig is talking 
about. He says, on the one hand, that its fundamentally 
changed. On the other hand, he reiterates that they 
stand by Resolution 435. Something is wrong here. The 
difficulty with South Africa over the last couple of years 
was obstensibly over the question of the implementation 
of 435. So far as I can tell, this Administration has not 
faced the question of implementation of 435 at all. That 
is not the subject of negotiations with South Africa. So 
far as I can tell, they are basically discussing things 
which were not an issue, or they raised as an issue some-
thing which is going to get them nowhere. At some 
point, they will have to come back to the implementa-
tion of 435, and the South Africans will have a field-day 
raising all of the objections which they raised before. 
Can you tell us what took place behind the scenes during 
the UN conference on Namibia in January of last year? 
McHenry: I think the most interesting thing that took 
place behind the scenes was the admission on the part of 
Mr. Dirk Mudge of the Turnhalle Group that he had no 
problem with the objectivity of the UN or the likelihood 
of fair elections or the effort on the part of the UN 
military contingent to keep the peace. He said that the 
South Africans were concerned about that. His concern 
was that he felt he was going to lose the election . As 
long as he felt he was going to lose, he was going to 
throw up a road block in terms of the elections. □ 
FINE POINTS IN FINE PRINT: WESTERN PROPOSALS AND AFRICAN RESPONSE 
Despite the Reagan Administration's promise of a solution to the Namibian problem in 1982, TransAfrica Forum has 
found that substantial points of disagreement still exist between the parties. Below is the verbatim text of the Contact 
Group (US, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Canada) original proposals for the Principles Concerning the Consti-
tuent Assembly, and the Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) response 
to those proposals. 
CONTACTGROUPPROPOSAL 
A. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY: 
I. The Constituent Assembly should be elected so as to 
ensure fair representation in that body to different 
political groups representing the people of Namibia. 
2. The Constituent Assembly will formulate the Con-
stitution for an independent Namibia in accordance 
with the principles in part B below and will adopt the 
Constitu tion as a whole by a two-thirds majority of all 
its members. 
B. PRI C IPLES FOR A CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPEN-
DE T NAMIBIA : 
I. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic 
state . 
2. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the 
state. It may be amended only by a designated process 
of either the legislature or the votes cast in a popular 
referendum. 
3. The constitution will provide for a system of govern-
ment with three branches: an elected executive branch 
which wil l be responsible to the legislative branch; a 
legislative branch to be elected by universal and equal 
suffrage which will be responsible for the passage of all 
laws; and an independent judicial branch which will be 
responsible for the interpretation of the Constitut ion 
and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the 
law. The executive and legislative branches wi ll be con-
stitul ed by periodic and genuine elections which wi ll be 
held by secret vote. 
4. The electoral system will ensure fair representation 
in the legislature to different political groups represent-
ing the people of Namibia . For example, by propor-
tional representation or by appropriate determination 
of constituencies or by a combination of both. 
5. There will be a declaration of fundamental rights, 
which will include the rights to life, personal liberty and 
freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience, to 
freedom of expression, including freedom of speech 
and a free press, to freedom of assembly and associa-
tion, including political parties and trade unions; to due 
process and equality before the law; to protection from 
arbitrary deprivation of private property without 
prompt and just compensation; and to freedom from 
racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. 
The declaration of rights will be consistent with the pro-
visions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The declaration of right s will be enforceable by the 
courts, at the instance of the aggrieved ind ividual. 
6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offenses with 
re1rospective effect or to provide for increased penalties 
with retrospective effect. 
7. Provision will be made to secure equal access by all 
to recruitment to the public service, the police service 
and the defence services. The fair admin istration of per-
sonnel policy in relation to these services wi ll be assured 
by appropriate independent bodies . 
8. Private cultural, social, health and educational in-
stituti om will be open to a ll without discrimination. 
9. Provision will be made for the establi shment of 
elected counci ls for local and regional administrative 
and fi sca l purposes. D 
FRONTLINE STATES RESPONSE 
During a meeting in Dar Es Salaam, the foreign 
ministers of the Frontline States, the foreign ministers 
of Kenya and Nigeria, and the President of SW APO 
discussed the Contact Group proposals. Two caveats 
were raised. First, a glaring problem exists with the 
Western proposals' amendment of Resolution 435. By 
setting forth constitutional principles, the Contact 
Group proposals preempt the work of the Constituent 
Assembly which 435 establishes . Thus, the Frontline 
States felt that by agreeing to the consideration of the 
Western constitutional principles that they would be 
agreeing to the prior writing of the consti tution . They 
st ress, however, that they do not see this exercise as sup-
planting 435 because the Contact Group proposals are 
merely guideposts. When the Constituent Assembly 
meets, they argue that the actual writing of the constitu-
tion will be left to the Namibians as 435 guarant ees. 
Secondly, the Frontline States object to specific pro-
visions of the Contact Group proposals. In the Dar Es 
Salaam meeting, they agreed to amend the first para-
graph Section A of the Contact Group proposal as 
follows: 
"Elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly 
which will adopt a Constitution for an independent 
Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organiza-
tion and powers of a ll members of government. Every 
adult Namibian will be eligible without discrimination 
or fear of intimidation from a ny source to vote, cam-
paign, and stand for election to the Constituent 
Assembly. Voting will be by secret ballot with provi-
sions made for those who cannot read or write. The 
date for elections, the electoral system, the preparation 
of voter rolls, and other aspects of electoral procedure 
will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political 
parties and interested persons, without regard to 
political views, a fu ll and fair opportunity to organize 
and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of 
speech, assembly, movement, and press shall be guar-
anteed." Some of these elements were taken directly 
from the UN proposed plan itself. 
In explaining the Frontline amendment; Theo-Ben 
Gurirab, SW APO's Permanent Representative to the 
UN, pointed out the inherent flaws in the Contact 
Group's proposal. The Frontline position is that the 
Contact Group proposal seeks to assuage South African 
fears by perpetuating ethnic-based representation and 
further entrenching apartheid-bantustanic provisions 
now in practice. The Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) and SW APO find this process fundamentally 
unacceptable since it "is intended to keep the Namibian 
people disunited and separated physically ... It is the 
white minority which presently holds power and 
monopolizes economic interests and institutions that 
are predicated on apartheid laws and legislation . .. in-
tended to perpetuate white control." The African vision 
of Namibia 's future, Gumab explained, " is to embark 
upon a program of reconciling the variou s racial-ethnic 
groups ... and to seek to unite all Namibian people to 
rise above tribal and racial affiliations." D 
CONTACT GROUP NON-PAPER 
The Contact Group has also presented the Frontline States and SW APO with a "Non-Paper" on security questions. It must be 
noted that Pretoria has, lime and again, invited the independent African countries individually to enter into non-aggression pacts 
with South Africa which are basically intended lo undermine the cause of liberation in southern Africa. All the Frontline States in-
cluding Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Lesotho have rejected this idea. The Non-Paper which follows represents another such 
attempt-this time raised by the Contact Group rather than the South Africans themselves. It is also, from the Frontline States 
point of view, another attempt to circumscribe the prospective, independent Namibian government's capacity to make its own 
security arrangements. 
CONT ACT GROUP NON-PAPER (COMPLETE TEXT) 
I. All States will respect the independence, the sovereignty, 
the territor ial integrity and the policy of non-alignment of 
Namibia, in particular by refraining from the unlawful threat 
or use of force, or from any other act inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations. All States are urged to 
manifest their will to respect these principles. 
2. The State of Namibia will live in peace and develop 
friendly relations with other States in accordance with inter-
national law. It will therefore not permit organized act ivities 
within its territory directed towards the commission of any act 
of aggression or any other act which involves an unlawful 
threat or use of force against any other State. The neighboring 
States wil l follow the same principle regarding their relations 
with Namibia. 
3. The State of Namibia will not permit within its territory 
the installation of foreign military bases or the presence of 
foreign military units except by virtue of a decision of the UN 
Security Counci l or in accordance with the exercise of its right 
of self-defence if an armed attack occurs against it, as pro-
vided for in the C harter of the United Nations. D 
FRONTLINE STATES POSITION 
For the Frontline States and SW APO, the Contact Group 
non-paper has very ser ious and far reaching implications for 
the future. If they were to agree to the terms of the non-paper, 
then they would have to agree, before Namibia was granted 
independence, to establishing a multi-part y system, to adopt-
ing a non-aligned policy, to not allowing foreign military 
bases, to not entering into military agreements with foreign 
powers, and to not giving military ass istance to liberation 
movements such as the African National Congress (ANC). 
Moreover, should they agree to these conditions, they would, 
in effect, be agreeing to a permanent role for South Africa in 
enforcing them . Thus, the non-paper would create a pretext 
for South Africa to intervene in Namibia in the future. As 
SW APO has pointed out: " ... We have a unique situation in 
Namibia: after independence for the first time in the 
decolonization of the whole continent, our ex-colonial power 
will be just across the river with every intention to subvert, to 
destabilize, to intervene should SW APO come to power." 
Either Namibia is an independent, sovereign state with the 
power to decide what arrangements it will make with the 
world community, or it is not independent. For these reasons, 
the Frontline States have decided that the non-paper should 
not even be considered. D 
REVISED CONT ACT GROUP PROPOSAL (EXCERPTS) 
In December 1981, the Contact Group proposed the revised Principles Concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution 
for an Independent Namibia which follows. Responding to the Frontline States objections, the Contact Group has adopted a new 
first paragraph, Sec1ion A. However, a second part has been added which sets forth the struc1ure of the Consti1uen1 Assembly. 
Although a number of questions have been raised by the revised proposal, TransAfrica Forum was unable to get !he Frontline 
States position before going to press in late December. 
REVISED CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL 
A. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
l. In Accordance with UNSCR 435 , elections will be held to 
select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a constitution 
for an independent Namibia. The constitution will determine 
the organization and powers of all levels of government. 
Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination 
or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign, 
and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly . Voting 
will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who 
cannot read or write. The date of the elections, the electoral 
system. the preparation of voters rolls and other aspects of 
electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to 
give all political parties and interested persons, without regard 
to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize 
and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of 
speech, assembly, movement, and press shall be guaranteed. 
The electoral system will seek to ensure fair representation in 
the Constituent Assembly to political parties which gain 
substantia l support in the election . To this end , half the 
members of the Constituent Assembly will be elected on a na-
tional basis by proportional representation and ha! f on the 
basis of single member constituencies. These constituencies 
will be delimited so that they have as nearly equal a number of 
inhabitants as may be reaso nably practicable. 
B. PRI NCIPLES FOR A CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT 
NAMIBIA : 
3. The constitution will determine the organization and 
powers of all levels of government. It will provide for a 
sys tem of government with three branches: a legislative 
branch to be elected by universal and equal suffrage which 
will be responsible for the passage of all laws; and an indepen-
dent judicial branch which will be respon sible for the inter-
pretation of the constitution and for ensuring it s supremacy 
and the authority of the law. The executive and legi slati ve 
branches will be constituted by periodic and genuine elections 
which will be held by secret vote. 
4. The electoral system will be consistent with the principles 
in A( l) above. 
7. Provision will be made for the balanced structuring of the 
public service, the police service and the defence services and 
for equal access by all to recruitment to these se rvices. The 
fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these ser-
vices will be assured by appropriate independent bodies. 
8. Provision will be made for the establishment of elected 
councils for local and / or regional administration. D 
REAGAN WATCH: US POLICY ON NAMIBIA 
A Chronological Guide (Jun.-Dec., 1981) 
June 1981: Organization of African Unity (OAU) sum-
mit meeting denounces the Reagan Administration 
policy on Namibia citing the expanded dealings between 
the US and South Africa as a "very dangerous" 
development. 
July 1981: Contact Group meets in Bonn, West Ger-
many to debate further the constitutional measures 
developed at the Group's May meeting. Group con-
tinues its debate in Paris. 
Contact Group meets in Ottawa, Canada to discuss 
Namibian future during the Ottawa Economic Summit 
meeting of Western nations. 
August 1981: South African troops invade Angola with 
widespread air and ground assaults. 
Reagan Administration issues carefully worded state-
ment blaming SW APO guerillas and the Angolan 
Government for the South African invasion. 
September 1981: US vetoes Security Council Resolution 
condemning South Africa for its invasion of Angola. 
Haig and other Contact Group members meet to reach a 
PROFILE ON PEOPLE: THEO-BEN GURIRAB 
If you are looking for up-to-date in-
formation on the South West Africa 
People's Organization (SW APO), your 
first stop should be Theo-Ben Gurirab, 
SW APO's Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations. 
For more than nine years, Gurirab 
has been telling the Namibia story to 
whomever will listen. He has appeared 
on countless radio and television 
broadcasts, met with members of Congress, and 
marched in American protest demonstrations on behalf 
of liberation for his homeland. And he has been the 
chief link in the chain of UN-Contact Group negotia-
tions on Namibia over the last three years. 
Gurirab is a seasoned veteran, a campaigner of un-
flagging energy and devotion. As chief spokesman in 
the US for his organization since 1972, he often is called 
upon to provide information to an American public 
both ignorant and naive on African matters. 
He remains unfailingly polite, soft spoken and effec-
tive at his tasks. When he speaks, his sincerity and com-
mitment are impressive. Gurirab is a very believable and 
articulate presence. There are no hidden nuances or im-
precise utterances on his part. 
Born January 23, 1939 in Usakos, a railway town in 
Namibia s central western region, Gunrab grew up in a 
Lutheran household. "My father was a worker", he 
says simply. He attended a primary German Lutheran 
consensus of a list of guarantees for preserving the white 
minority and South African interests in Namibill.. 
Contact Group announces timetable for final negotia-
tions for Namibian independence after UN negotiations 
with South Africa and the Frontline States. 
Senate votes to repeal Clark Amendment. 
October 1981: Contact Group travels to Africa, visits 
Frontline capitals, Pretoria and Windhoek to present 
Constitutional guideline proposals and a non-paper on a 
non-aggression pact. 
November 1981: Foreign Ministers from Frontline 
States, Kenya, and Nigeria meet with SW APO Presi-
dent in Dar Es Salaam, reject the non-paper, and revise 
the constitutional proposals to counter bantustan ele-
ment. 
December 1981: UNIT A leader Jonas Savimbi con-
cludes US visit after conferring with Haig. 
Rep. Derwinski (R-III.) withdraws Clark Amendment 
repeal effort. House retains the Clark Amendment. 
House-Senate Conferences, agrees to retain the amend-
ment. 
Contact Group presents revised proposal to Frontline 
States and SW APO. 
Missionary school and then went on to 
qualify as a teacher after attending 
Okahtndja Secondary and Teachers 
Training School. 
Following periods of teaching and 
political activism in the 1960's in his 
homeland, he finally came to the US to 
study at Temple University where he 
received a BA in political science and 
an MA in international relations. He 
embarked on further graduate study but in 1972 was 
called to become SW APO's representative at the UN. 
During this period, Gurirab also married a black 
American, and has three children, one girl and two 
boys. 
The politics of decolonization and a life of exile often 
takes an incalculable toil on the human spirit. Theo-Ben 
Gurirab gathers his strength from a warm family en-
vironment and from his conviction that Namibia will be 
imminently independent. He travels widely as a member 
of SW APO's central Committee and as SW APO's Sen-
ator to the Institute for Namibia based in Lusaka, Zam-
bia. He interprets US policy activities and decisions to 
SW APO's President, Sam Nujoma, from a sound basis 
of understanding American perspectives. When the 
negotiations process is ended, it is hard not to speculate 
that someday Gurirab will be found at home in Namibia 
teaching the young that they now have a chance to make 
a nation. D 
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